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Organising Learning: Informal workplace learning in a trade union campaign to organise private~ 
sector child care workers. 
Introduction 
The modern workplace is often portrayed as one that is being released from the constraints of traditional 
work practices and rigid organisational structures. The introduction of new technology combined with • 
flexibility in production and labour relations, and greater individual discretion over work processes have been 
key elements in managerial terminology that predicted new types of work and jobs for a new economy. It was 
argued that old fashioned, low-skill jobs would be replaced by high skill work requiring qualifications needing 
regular updating. An unstoppable growth in the number of knowledge workers would replace the declining 
number of routine jobs. 
However the experience in Australia undermines these predictions. The labour market has taken on an 
hourglass shape with a growing polarisation of the workforce as job numbers increase in the upper echelons, 
disappear in the middle levels and where the largest number of new jobs are created in low paying work that 
are predominantly casual and insecure. (Cully 2003) 
This paper looks at recent developments in the restructuring of one service industry ~ private child~care ~ in 
Australia. It examines how a national trade union successfully developed new strategies to recruit previously 
unorganised workers in the rapidly expanding private~for~profit child~care sector. Finally, it discusses the 
inter~relationship of learning and organising among the union staff involved in the organizing drive and the 
implications for the union's approach to organisational learning. 
What the union wanted to do 
Methodology 
The data for this pa per emerged as part of a broader project examining the changes in the work of 
organisers, and primarily the work of a group of Lead Organisers, in the Liquor, Hospitality and 
Miscellaneous Union (LHMU). During the time of the research the child~care organising was the largest 
coordinated campaign the union was running. 
Twenty~five staff including Assistant Secretaries, the Organising Director, Lead Co~ordinators, and Lead 
Organisers from five state branches, were interviewed. Among those interviewed the longest time anyone 
had been a Lead Organiser was 6 years. However the mean time was less than two years and a significant 
number had been a Lead for less than 2 years. By contrast a larger number of staff had many years 
experience in the union, or in other unions, and the practice of being a Lead was relatively short and clearly 
varied across the branches. 
In addition to the semi~structured interviews, union reports and planning documents were made available, 
two national seminars were conducted, many informal conversations with union staff were held, as well as 
participating in organised union activities including a State Convention, an organising blitz, and a number of 
planning meetings. 
The rise of private chlldcare 
The provision of childcare has undergone substantial change in Australia. When organised childcare centres 
started in the 19705 and 1980s they were almost entirely run by local not~for~profit community centres. They 
were jointly funded by federal and state government grants, which were dispersed through local municipal 
government with parents paying modest fees, and they were run by Committees made up of staff, parents 
and local government representatives. At the time no one imagined that the care of babies and pre~school 
children could, or should, return a profit. 
The Keating Labor Government started to change the way childcare was funded in the early 1990s by 
extending childcare subsidies to private, for-profit centres. Then in 1997 the newly elected Howard 
conservative government ceased federal funding for the construction of centres, and instead under the 
rhetoric of 'choice' and 'competition' directed payments to parents as subsidies and later as additional tax 
concessions. An immediate impact was the decline in the number of public childcare centres as community 
centres struggled to meet costs, a reduction in the number of community childcare places, and sudden and 
steep fee rises. The regular stream of government subsidised fee income fuelled a growth of new private 
centres as a market in child care was created. Over the decade the proportion of privately owned centres 
increased from less than half to over 70 percent of the total, with many community centres closed or taken 
over. 




delivered and resting on a cornerstone of affordable, quality childcare the Quality Improvement and 
Accreditation System introduced in 1993 to the rise of the world's biggest publicly listed for-profit childcare 
company, ABC Learning Centres. 
ABC a new model for human service provision? 
ABC Learning Centres started in 1988 and listed on the stock exchange with 34 childcare centres in 2001. 
When listed it was valued at $25 million, but by 2006 its value had risen to $2.4 billion, with the original $2 
shares worth $39. By 2006 ABC had become the largest operator of private child care businesses in 
Australia, and the second largest childcare company in the world. 
The biggest beneficiaries of the Federal government's changed policy from supporting centres to subsioising 
individual parents have been companies such as ABC, which receives 44 per cent of its income, or $128m of 
its $292m revenue in 2005, from government subsidies. It is in effect a direct payment from the federal 
government to ABC and its shareholders, and ABC has been perfectly positioned to benefit from the 
government's privatisation and 'choice' policies. Former prominent Coalition politicians including the previous 
Federal Minister for Childcare Services Larry Anthony, former Federal Opposition Leader Andrew Peacock, 
former Victorian Premier Jeff Kennett and former Lord Mayor of Brisbane Sallyanne Atkinson, dominate the 
Board. As Eddy Groves, ABC's CEO succinctly explained in an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) in 2005 "You cannot help (but) to make some money". (Hills 2006) 
ABC has developed a carefully integrated business strategy that it expects can also be applied to other 
human service areas. The company has two colleges that recruit, train and accredit new childcare workers 
thus providing its own supply of carers trained in the corporate philosophy from the start. Its head office 
produces standardised curriculum for its centres across the country and also coordinates the menus and 
interior design. All play equipment and furniture is provided for each centre through an exclusive agreement 
with a company that ABC previously owned. It has a separate property arm that owns the centre sites thus 
reducing debt on the company. 
Childcare centres' operating costs are high with the largest component being labour costs. Because of this, 
high occupancy rates are crucial for profits such that centres with occupancy rates below 50 per cent lose 
money and are only marginally profitable until the rate reaches 80 per cent. at which point they quickly move 
into the black. Therefore keeping labour costs and staff:child ratios down while achieving high occupancy 
rates are critical factors in the company's profit strategy. 
In 2006 ABC floated additional shares with the income directed to payoff debt in order to position the 
company for further acquisitions and expansion in North America. (King 2006, Hills, 2006) With the Australian 
childcare industry expected to slow in the next three years, ABC has moved into a new expansion phase by 
purchasing centres in North America, and it is also looking to take this model into aged care and other areas 
of public education previously considered out of bounds to profit making companies. ASC's 'managed 
growth', is aimed at achieving a dominant position in the market by taking over smaller private providers 
firstly in Australia, New Zealand followed by North America, which provides some franchises and a foothold 
into, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Indonesia. In 2006 ABC became the world's largest publicly-listed 
childcare company when it bought Learning Care, a Nasdaq-listed operator of 460 childcare centres in 
twenty-five US states, for $218 million. That was followed in June 2006 with the purchase of another 
seventeen centres in California and options to buy another seven centres in the State. In January 2007 it 
acquired the La Petite Academy with its 650 centres in 36 US states, with the capacity to serve 97,500 
children, effectively doubling the number of centres operating in the USA. (AAP, 2006, AAP, 2007) 
Critics of paid care services such as child and aged care, teaching and nursing claim that they are vulnerable 
to competitive pressures that often generate low-payllow-quality outcomes, increased prices, and place profit 
ahead of social obligations such as catering for children with disabilities or for under two year aids because 
they are more expensive to look after. Folbre (2006) notes however this situation also creates the potential to 
build broader political coalitions that could push for a high-pay/high-quality alternative. 
Introducing market relations into childcare provision has been extremely beneficial for some companies such 
as ABC, but it has also led to a massive increase in the cost of childcare for parents. Australian Bureau of 
Statistics data shows that childcare costs have increased by 62 percent between 2002-2006. (ABS 2005, 
ABS 2006) In addition, the uneven geographic distribution of childcare places arising from decisions based 
on profit expectations rather than meeting childcare need has meant that growing demand for places is not 
being met. With two-thirds of Australian mothers working, demand for childcare keeps growing and surveys 
show that there is a shortfall of up to 100,000 places. 
The union campaign new ways of organising and learning 
The new arrangements for child care and the growth in employment in private provision posed new 
challenges for the childcare workers' union. In particular the dominant position established by ABC meant 
that it was in a position to set the wage and employment conditions for workers in the industry generally. 
The union had traditionally high coverage rates within public childcare provision. It had won important award 
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victories on pay, gender pay equity and skill related training in the 1980s and 1990s. Because the prevailing 
mode of delivery had been through public and community centres it had not paid much attention to private 
provision and had lower rates of membership coverage. Even after ABC had begun to establish itself the 
union had not made many advances in signing new members in that sector. 
The union did however make a strategic decision to organise ABC workers as part of its emphasis on 
organising unorganised workers in strategically important industries. In late 2005 the union's leaders and 
Lead Organisers in childcare, devised a plan to take on ABC Learning. Its goal, or what the organisers call 
'the mantra', was to build power across all the childcare industry into the future. The means to do that is 
summarised by three strategies, to take wages out of competition between the community and private • 
sector, to build density, and to speak with one voice. 
Its first efforts had been less than successful. It had treated the organising effort as though it was any other 
campaign. It had not taken into account the personal presence that Eddy Groves had among his employees, 
so that when the union issued press releases attacking the company it had alienated some of the potential 
members it was hoping to attract. It had also not taken into account the low level of union literacy among the 
workers, nor the company's success in communicating with its staff that the company would look after them 
and that therefore they did not need a union. In addition, Groves was a strong supporter of the govemment's 
industrial relations regime and had shown a willingness to make use of it, for instance recruiting staff to 
individual workplace contracts and wherever possible restricting union officials' access to the centres. When 
one State-Secretary issued a press release in 2004 claiming that the company had attempted to force down 
the wages and conditions of its employees in that state, Groves sued him, claiming defamation and 
effectively forcing a gag on the union. 
When the second round of organising commenced at the end of 2005 the union membership at ABC stood 
at just over 1300 members across Australia. One of the biggest hurdles the union faced before it could go 
into the field was the inaccurate data it had to work with. It didn't know how big the company was, how many 
employees it had, nor could it be confident of the accuracy of its own membership records and therefore 
what level of density the union had. The unreliability of the membership records meant they had to be 
cleaned up. The system was not a tool to aid organising and there was no discrete budget for growth, 
making the plan to be in a position of real bargaining power in only three months ambitious at best. After the 
changes had been made to the data system and the second round of organising commenced the union's 
aim was to increase membership to a density level where it could have real bargaining power with the 
company. 
Since the late 1990's the union had been going through a major organisational change, implementing what it 
understood to be the organising model and changing the way union work was organised. Teams of 
organisers had been established with Leads appointed to implement organising plans focused on achieving 
membership growth. New organising techniques were developed and honed including systematic contacting 
of non-members in the workplace and in their homes. 'Blitzing', where groups of organisers would 
methodically contact potential members using prepared scripts with the purpose of signing them up to the 
union, had been trialed among casino workers and contract cleaners. The lessons learned from these first 
campaigns were now put to use in the childcare campaign. 
The changes in work organisation had been taken up unevenly through the union but there was sufficient 
evidence of success in some branches, notably in Western Australia and South Australia, and in some 
industry sectors that the union was confident that continued attention to organising would reap growth 
rewards. Organisers and Lead Organisers had participated in traditional structured education programs but 
much of the important learning was now being conducted informally as part of team work. Leads were 
expected to brief and de-brief their organisers, the plan was continually monitored and organisers were 
prepped in one-to-one conversations, handling objections ('innoculation'), using a notation system that would 
record visits and conversations, and setting time limits on conversations in order to 'call the question', that is, 
asking the potential member directly if slhe would join. 
The main objective of every visit was to recruit new members, or to get a 'sign-up', it was not to deal with 
any particular grievance the worker might have, nor to have a general discussion about childcare or 
unionism. There was however a straightforward message and it was the same across the country 'We'd like 
you to join up to the Union so that you can have a voice in the new national agreement.' 
When organisers visited a childcare centre they were required to collect information about the Centre. As 
well as the number of childcare workers on the site, they were expected to record the centre's name, 
addresses, phone numbers, license holders and numbers of children. A record of each centre is kept so that 
when the organiser returns if one or more of the workers have moved the organiser will follow up by phone 
to find out where they have moved to, and the system will then be adjusted to record them against another 
site. 
All visits and member conversations and responses are allocated a score indicating whether the 
112 
conversation was positive, hostile, undecided or raised some reason for not joining. Those reasons are also 
categorised according to the degree of objection, with the most common objections being "J'm not interested'; 
'I have to talk to my spouse, parent, friend', and "I can't afford it'. Organisers were prepared for these 
objections during pre-visit training and where new objections arose they were recorded and became part of 
the ongoing training in how to deal with objections. 
Victoria, one of the campaign's Lead Organisers, is responsible for a team of organisers and for 
implementing the organising plan, preparing, briefing and debriefing the organisers, assessing and reporting 
on the resource needs of the campaign and participating in the national team coordinating the camJ2aign. 
While not an explicit role, she also mentors the newer and less experienced organisers. She gave an 
example of the effectiveness of recording visit details and using the tracking system. At one centre she 
spoke to a woman about joining the union but was told that she couldn't join just then because she wanted to 
talk it over with her partner. Six weeks later VictOria returned to the Centre and this time commenced the 
conversation by asking 'How did the discussion go with your partner?' the woman was taken aback that 
Victoria had remembered, was unable to use that objection this time around and so a new conversation 
commenced. 
The tracking is so detailed that another lead organiser recounted an example of a woman who on their first 
contact told her to 'Get F***ed, I don't want to know about the union.' From this low starting point the 
organiser gradually developed the communication on each visit until on their ninth conversation she was 
signed up. 
In the first six months of the drive over 3,000 centres were visited and access was gained at 2,600 of them. 
In some centres where access was gained the visit was restricted so that in 60 cases the Director escorted 
the organiser around the centre and in 225 cases the organiser was restricted to a single room. There were 
over 9,200 conversations held between workers and organisers and in all cases some record was made of 
the conversation. At the end of the first six-month period over 2,000 new members had joined the union, a 
conversion rate of 22 percent of all conversations. Another 6,500 had given a 'soft knock back', and only 600, 
or 7 percent had given a hostile response. In six months membership numbers across the country increased 
by 126 percent, while in some states, including big state branches, growth tripled and even quadrupled. 
This rate of growth for a relatively short period was very successful. It confirmed that applied systematic 
contacting with a clear goal would lead to the sort of growth that the union movement had been talking about 
in policy documents. importantly the influx of new members also meant a new, steady income stream that 
would support further organising, research and campaigning for gains for those workers. 
The growth is even more remarkable given the environment that the union is workins in. Apart from the 
general climate where union membership has been in steady decline for more than 15 years and where the 
media paints a picture of unions as outdated, the conditions within the childcare industry present growth 
organising with particular challenges, The majority of workers in the industry are young, female, part-time 
workers in an industry characteristically described as 'soft skilled', The company is hostile to unions, 
attempting wherever possible to employ staff on individual contracts and leading new employees to believe 
that they are not allowed to join the union. 
There were other measures that the union needed to improve upon if the drive was going to be sustained. 
One of the most important was bringing forward new members to act as 'contacts' or 'activists' in the union. 
One intended outcome of the one to one conversations was for organisers to invite those who showed an 
interest in the campaign and the union to become a contact at the centre, The majority of new contacts who 
agreed to take on the role in their Centres are not only new to being a face of the union and to bargaining, 
they are also new to unionism. The success 'In getting new members to become contacts varied across the 
states, with a ratio of contact-to-members in the three largest branches ranging from 1: 5 in NSW, 1:7 in 
Queensland and 1 :20 in Victoria. in the states with lower membership numbers the ratio ranges from 1 :17 in 
South Australia and 1 :37 in Western Australia. 
Campaign outcomes 
In 2007 despite the union not having reached the density target it set itself before it would enter negotiations 
a new national union agreement was reached, which will set new standards for the industry. The 
agreement's key provisions include a two per cent annual pay rise for the two years of the agreement plus 
increases of between eleven and twenty per cent to reflect the phasing-in of pay equity and work-value 
increases awarded by state industrial relations commissions before WorkChoices was introduced; paid time 
to prepare programs for children; free uniforms; paid tuition for further stUdy and the use of external cleaners 
in all centres - previously the workers were often expected to clean their centre, and significantly ended the 
use of individual AWAs in the company. Ninety per cent voted for he agreement and hundreds of staff 




The campaign to organise childcare workers employed by ABC is part of a larger project. The union is in the 
process of a thoroughgoing change in its approach to organising workers, achieving membership growth, and 
building a different type of union for the future that involves both organisational and cultural change alongside 
new ways of learning and development for staff and members. The chi/dcare campaign sits on a cont"lnuum 
between earlier state-based organising efforts in aged-care and more applied and strategic industry focussed 
leverage campaigns. Since the ABC drive, the union has embarked on an even larger scale, internationally-
coordinated campaign in the cleaning industry that reflects not only a more sustained approach to organising 
but also a more sophisticated use of research and media and a more strategic outreach to community 
organisations. (LHMU 2006b) 
One of the union's priorities has been to 'learn from national campaigns', and it locates this within longer term 
questions it has posed for itself What sort of union does it want to be in 2010; how does it build power in key 
industries and the broader society; and what does it need to get there? Learning, referred to by the union 
leaders as 'development', that incorporates formal and informal workplace learning, is therefore a critical 
factor in its future development. (Brown 2007) 
This poses new challenges for the union's leaders as they try to facilitate a new learning environment aimed 
at furthering the development process for individuals, teams, and the union as an organisation, at the same 
time as they embark on intense organising campaigns. It means thinking anew about the organisational 
structure that will help it achieve its objectives; about how to facilitate individual learning and development; 
and how to ensure that the teams, and organisation as a whole, can adapt quickly to changes in the external 
environment. It means planning how to incorporate Argyris and Schon's three levels of learning - operational 
leaming (learning against norms built into plans), strategic learning (where existing plans are modified to 
respond to changes in the external environment), and learning related to questions of purpose and wider 
community values. (Argyris & Schon 1981) 
The efforts to organise chHdcare workers can be assessed in this context. Staff working on the campaign 
concluded that its strengths were having clear aims and targets and clear methods of reporting. This was 
provided through a national organising plan, which was based on assessing the resources required, 
allocating the roles for national and branch offices; sharing resources across branches; identifying new 
contacts in centres, establishing effective community linkages; and supporting the organiSing effort with new 
capacity in corporate research and information technology systems. Dedicated growth organisers, including 
temporary member organisers, were appointed; weekly national tele-conferences of the lead organisers and 
coordinators were held to coordinate action, receive reports of progress and obstacles, assess information, 
arrive at decisions and then allocate tasks and responsibilities to state based teams. 
Conclusion 
The union hopes to show that the lowest paid workers can fight back and win, even within the restrictive 
framework imposed by Australia's WorkChoices legislation, and that the lessons of winning campaigns can 
be extended to other industries. The child care campaign gives pointers for successful organising - planned, 
national, well-resourced, dedicated growth objective, disciplined, and strategic - as well as some limitations. 
Achieving the membership growth in this campaign required considerable staff and financial resources and 
means that other areas of the union' coverage receive less attention. Maintaining that commitment over a 
longer period requires a different type of organisational discipline especially where the original targets are not 
met. 
The focus for a six-month campaign is also easier to maintain as everyone's attention is geared towards a 
clear timeline. Beyond that and new challenges of coordination, motivation and development arise. Honing 
the techniques of organising, especiaUy in the hostile industrial relations environment now pertaining in 
Australia, is crucially important for unions and new union organisers to develop. But perhaps more important 
than learning the 'how' is to understand the 'Why'. 
This is an area requiring more attention if the union is to deepen its organising drive in the future and 
consolidate an active membership base as it tries to convert members into contacts and contacts into 
activists. It will be a test of whether the union can move from staff led organising drives to one where 
members begin to playa larger role in directing the union's strategies. But what then? Wilat will the shape of 
the bargaining look like? Who will determine? How will contacts become activists? What support will need to 
be provided? And what of the leaming for the organiSing staff? How will the knowledge, experience and 
learning acquired in campaigns like ABC be used in the organisation to effect change, to deepen individual 
and organisational development? Will new leaming tools or artefacts from campaigns be developed and 
turned into artefacts for learning? How will those lessons become absorbed? These are the next stages of 
organisational development if there is to be an active, engaged and informed membership driving the 
organisational and cultural change necessary to renew unionism. (Lerner 2003) 
In the twentieth century there were workers who were considered hard or impossible to organise - waterside 
and construction workers, those employed as day labour but as a result of mititant organising campaigns led 
by unions with clear political and industrial objectives those workers became the backbone of organised 
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labour. Today employment growth is in industries and areas that are similarly considered too difficult to 
organise - call centres, hospitality, retail, contractors, and childcare. 
Therefore it is important to understand how workers, in what are often precarious areas of work, can organise 
to defend their interests and to win against those who would keep them in this position. In the case of 
childcare workers we can observe particular decisions and efforts that reduce their pay, their conditions, their 
satisfaction at work through deliberate intended actions designed to create a marketable commodity to trade 
and increase the wealth of a few. It is facilitated by govemment policy that not only approves of but also 
creates the opportunities and frameworks for precariousness, or flexible work, to occur. 
There is now a substantial international literature that debates and describes aspects or activities in the 
organising model (Bronfenbrenner 1998; Carter 2006; Carter & Cooper 2002; de Turbeville 2004, 2007; 
Ellem 2003; Lerner 2003; Lopez 2004; Milkman & Voss 2004). Less available are the details of specific 
organising efforts that offer the opportunity for leaming from those campaigns and more specifically how 
union organisers learn to change their work in order to achieve membership growth. 
The union's efforts to organise previously unorganised childcare workers reflects its belief that the best 
defence for low wage workers is for them to combine in order to alter the arrangements that dictate their pay, 
working hours, conditions, and in this case, quality issues around staff: child ratios, safety, and the physical, 
educational and social environment for the children. It is an orientation that has the transformative potential of 
changing the workers' understanding of their position in the industry and their ability to exercise agency. It 
raises the democratic potential of fe-shaping not only their working conditions but also their union, that is, the 
vehicle for their agency and voice by exercising leadership therein. These potentials remain at this stage 
unrealised. Studying the progress of these organising campaigns and the process of organisational change 
can assist in redressing the underpinning foundations of precariousness. 
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'The largest US childcare provider with 3 per cent of the market is Knowledge Learning Corp, which is substantially 
ovmed by the former junk bond king Michael Milken. 
'The Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (LHMU) is one of Australia's largest unions covering predominantly 
low wage service workers in hospitality (hotels, clubs and casinos) human care (child and aged care); and property 
services (cleaning and security). 
'The steps involved in this kind of one-to-one organising have been borrowed from the US Service Employees 
Industrial Union (SEIU) and have been adapted and gradually evolved through practice in organising blitzes in both the 
workplace and in home visits. (see Lopez 72-78) 
, Work Choices was introduced in March 2006. The main target of Work Choices were trade unions and their right to 
organise workers and the legislation's centrepiece was the introduction of individual contracts knO\Vfl as Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs) that would override any existing collective industrial award or agreement. AWAs were 
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over 12 months, and the legislation allowed employers to dismiss any worker without reason if the company employed 
less than 100 people, effecting 4 million Australian workers. 
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